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bound to receive or pay for it, because it is not the thing he agreed
to purchase: H~oward v. .Hoey, 23 Wend. 351; Hart v. Wright,
17 Id. 277; 2 Kent's Com. 480; Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 Mees.
& W. (Exch.) 399. * * * But if the article is at the time of the
sale in existence and defined and is specifically sold, and the title
passes in prcesenti to the vendee, there will be no implied warranty
that the article is merchantable. * * * Where the sale is executory
if the goods purchased are found on examination to be unsound,
or not to answer the order given for them, the purchaser must
immediately return them to the vendor or give him notice to take
them back, and thereby rescind the contract, or h6 will be presumed to have acquiesced in the quality of the goods: 2 Kent
Com. 480 ; Fisher v. Samuda, 1 Camp. 190 ; Hopkins v. Applefy,
1 Stark. 477; Milner v. Tucker, 1 Car. & P. 15; 23 Wend.
3"52.2s
ARUR BIDDLE.
(To be continued.)
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CASTELLAIN v. PRESTON.
The owners of houses which were insured against fire contracted to sell the property, and reserved power under the contract to name the time for completion. The
property was burned, and the insurance compan7, in ignorance of the contract, paid
the vendors for the damage done. The vendors neither reinstated the premises nor
handed the ibsurance money to the purchasers, but they subsequently named a time
for completion, and the purchase was eventually completed.
Held, that the insurance company could not recover from the vendors the amount
of the insurance money wlieh they had paid.
The fact that an insurance company is ignorant of a contract for sale at the time
of payment is, in such a case, immaterial.
The only principle applicable to such a case is that of subrogation in the full sense
of that term, and where the right claimed by an insurance company is under a contract between the insured and third parties, it must be confined to the case of a
contract relating to the subject-matter of the insurance. A contract for sale is not
a contract directly or indirectly for the preservation of the buildings insured.
Darrellv. Tibbitts, L. R., 5 Q. B. Div. 560, considered.
Semble, the contract must be one which subsists at the time when the claim under
the policy has matured.

consideration of action.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff as chairman of the
FURTHER
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Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Company against the
trustees of a certain will, for the sum of 3301. and interest from
the 25th of September 1878, or, in the alternative, for declaration
that the defendants were trustees for the plaintiff of the same sum
and interest.
The said sum of '301. had been paid by the company to the
defendants under the following circumstances:By an agreement made in July 1878, the defendants agreed
with E. Rayner and J. E. Rayner (hereafter called the purchasers)
for the sale to them of a piece of land in Liverpool, with a house
and workshops erected thereon, for 31001. By the agreement the
defendants were entitled to name a day for completion of the contract, and until they named such day were entitled to rescind.
By a notice duly given in March 1879, they named the 6th of
May 1879, for completion, which, however, did not take place until
December of that year, when the purchase-money was paid.
Prior to, and at the date of the agreement the premises were
insured against fire by the defendants with the company; but the
agreement contained no reference to the insurance. The policy
was in the usual form, and gave the insurers the option of reinstating the property.
In August 1878, the premises were damaged by fire.
On the 25th of September 1878, the company, being then
ignorant of the agreement, paid the defendants a sum of 3301., in
settlement of all claims between the parties in respect of the fire.
The defendants, after receiving such payment, refused to band
it over to the purchasers or to reinstate the premises. And, therefore, in May 1879, an action of Bayner v. Preston, was brought
by the purchasers against the present defendants for a declaration
that they (the then plaintiffs) were entitled to the benefit of the
moneys received by the defendants from the company, and to have
such moneys paid or allowed to them accordingly, or otherwise to
have them laid out towards reinstating the premises.
That action was dismissed with costs by JFSSEL, M. R., whose
decision was affirmed by BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ., dissentiente
JAMES, L. J. (L. R., 14 Ch. Div. 297; L. R., 18 Ch. Div. 1; 21
Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 89), but JESSEL, M. R., during the argument in the court below, and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ., in the

Court of Appeal, expressed dbubts whether such an action as
the present would not lie.
VoL. XXXI.-22
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This action was brought in October 1881, in the Liverpool District Registry of the Queen's Bench Division, but on being opened
before CHITTY, J., at the LiverpoolWinter Assizes in January 1882,
was adjourned for further consideration before his lordship in
London.
Charles Bussell, Q. C., and Tobin, appeared for the plaintiff.
Gully, Q. C., and Kennedy, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHITTY, J.-This case raises an important question on the law
of fire insurance. [His lordship then stated the facts, and continued :-] I pause here for a moment to say that the circumstande
that the insurers were ignorant of the contract for sale is immaterial. It is clear that the vendors could have recovered, notwithstanding the contract for sale. That point was decided in Coilingridge v. -oyal Exchange Assurance Co., L. R., -3Q. B. Div. 173,
where a suggestion was made by the learned judges who decided it
that in such circumstances the vendors might be trustees of the
amount recovered for the purchasers. Acting possibly on that
suggestion, the purchasers brought the action of Bayner v. Preston
in the Chancery Division. [His lordship then referred to the doubts
above referred to and expressed by the judges in that case, and
continued :-]
There is no English authority directly in point,
and the question must be decided on principle.
The plaintiffs contend that the contract of insurance is merely a
contract of indemnity, and unless they recover in this action the
defendants will receive double satisfaction. Undoubtedly it is
settled law that a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity.
The principle of subrogation applies to fire insurance, whether the
subject-matter of the insurance be chattels or buildings annexed to
the soil. The law on the subject is ably stated in the judgment
of the Master of the Rolls and of Lord Justice MELLISH in the
-North British Fire Insurance Case, Law Rep., 5 Ch. Div. 569,
and also by Lord CAIRNS in Simpson v. Thomson: Law Rep.,
3 App. Cases 279, where he says, "1I know of no foundation
for the right of the underwriters, except the well-known principle
of law, where one has agreed to indemnify another, be will, on
making good the indemnity, be entitled to succeed to all the ways
and means by which the person indemnified might have protected
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himself against or reimbursed himself for the loss." What is the
principle of subrogation ? On payment the insurers are entitled
to enforce all the remedies, whether in contract or in tort, which
the insured has against third parties, whereby the insured can compel such third parties to make good the loss insured against.
Familiar instances may be put. Where the owner of a building
insures, and the building is destroyed by a riot, the insurers, on payment, are subrogated to their right against the hundred. Where
the landlord insures, and he has a covenant by the tenant to repair,
the insurance office, on payment in like manner, succeed to the
rights of the landlord against his tenant. The same law applies
in the case of mortgagee and mortgagor where the mortgagor is
under the obligation to keep the buildings in repair.
In marine insurance there are the familiar instances of capture
and re-capture, the case of reprisals, such as in Bandal v. Cockran,
1 Ves. Sen. 98, but a limit was marked in those cases by the
decision of Burnand v. Rodocanachi, L. R., 6 Q. B. Div. 633.
There the underwriters, under a valued policy of the ship, which
was destroyed by The Alabama cruiser, paid as on a total loss.
The American government, under a treaty with the British government, provided a fund out of which the insured received a sum in
respect of the destruction of the ship, and the question was whether
that sum was part of the salvage (that point was put very clearly
by Lord Justice BRAMWE LL in his judgment), and it was held that
it was not; that in the circumstances the sum received by the shipowner was but a pure gift, and there was no right on the part of the
insurers to recover any part of it over against him. As I say, that
case marks the limit.
An obvious distinction exists between the case of marine insurance and of insurance of buildings annexed to the soil. In the
case of marine insurance, where there is a total constructive loss,
the thing is considered as abandoned to the underwriters, and as
vesting the property directly in them. But this doctrine of abandonment cannot be applied to the insurance of buildings annexed to
the soil. Although the buildings annexed are destroyed, there cannot be a cession of the right to the soil itself. This, however, creates
no difficulty ; and the principle of subrogation applies as in the case
of a partial loss under an ordinary fire insurance for loss of goods,
and the principle was applied by the Court of Appeal in Darrell v. Tibbitts, L. R., 5 Q. B. Div. 560. This case was mainly
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relied on by the plaintiff, and requires to be carefully examined.
The facts are simple. The landlord insured and had a covenant
with his lessee, urider which the lessee was bound to rebuild or
reinstate in the event of damage by fire. The lessee had his remedy
over against the Brighton Corporation, but that circumstance was
immaterial, and was so treated by the Court of Appeal. After the
insurers had paid the landlord for his loss the tenant repaired, and
the question was whether the insurer was entitled to recover the
amount he had paid. The court held that he was. The case, when
examined, turns out to be qne of subrogation. If the lessees
had not repaired, the insurers, undoubtedly on payment, would
have, on that principle, been entitled to bring an action on the
lessees' covenant which related to the subject-matter of insurance
and its preservation. The only difference was one rather of form
than of substance arising from the circumstance that the landlord
had, by reason of 'the reinstatement of the building, actually received
for the loss the benefit of the covenant to repair, and consequently
no right of action on the covenant remained. This difficulty the
court surmounted, the judges using various modes of expression
in formulating technically the plaintiff's right to recover; but all
resulted alike in the affirmation of the principle that the insurers
were subrogated to the position of the insured in relation to the
covenant to repair. I will refer to some passages in the judgments
with a view to make good that position. Lord Justice BRETT
refers to the judgment in the case of the North British Company,
and says, "If the tenant had not repaired the damage, and had
declined to do so, the insurance company would have been bound
to pay the landlord who had insured with them, but would have
had a right to bring in his name an action against the tenants, and
recover from the tenants what they had paid to the landlord; in
other words, a policy of fire insurance is a contract of indemnity
similar to that which is contained in a policy of marine insurance.
That case seems to me further to show that if the landlord had
sued the tenants before he received payment from the insurance
compttny, he must have recovered from them, for it would have been
no answer by the tenant that the landlord was insured. That case
seems to me also to decide this, that'if the landlord had recovered
damages from the tenant equivalent to the injury done him by
the refusal of the tenant to repair, he could not afterwards sue the
insurance company. The landlord was paid by the insurance com-
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pany at a time when they could not resist his demand, as they were
bound by their contract to pay." Then referring to damage and
the liability of the Corporation of Brighton he says, "I think,
however, that the case stands in the same position as if the tenants
had executed the repairs with their own moneys." Then presently
he says, "If the company cannot recover the money back, it follows that the landlord will have the whole extent of his loss as to
the building made good by the tenants, and will also have the whole
amount of that loss paid by the insurance company. If that is so,
the whole doctrine of indemnity would be done away with; the
landlord would be not merely indemnified, he would be paid twice
over." Then he deals with the technical difficulties: "1A technical
difficulty -arises in my mind as to the ground upon which the landlord can be held liable in this action, but it is a difficulty which
ought to be surmounted." Then (without reading through the rest
of his judgment), he refers to various grounds on which he considers the plaintiffs might be entitled to recover the sum of money.
He says, in one part, the court had a right to imply a promise on
the part of the landlord to the insurance company at the time of
payment by them that, if the lease should be afterwards made good
by the tenants, he would repay the money which he had received
from the insurance company. Then he refers to marine insuraices,
and says, "The doctrine is well established that where something
is insured against loss either in a marine or a fire policy, after the
assured has been paid by the insurers for the loss, the insurers are
put into the place of the assured with regard to every right given
to him by the law respecting the subject-matter insured, and with
regard to every contract which touches the subject-matter insured,
and which contract is affected by the loss or the safety of the subject-matter insured by the reason of the peril insured against." I
will not proceed to read further, but I take it the substance of these
judgments is that the plaintiffs were in the particular case subrogated to the rights of the landlord against the tenant. Lord Justice
COTWON, at the commencement of his judgment, places the insurers
in the position of a surety. It would be too long to read through
all these judgments, but I will read, towards the bottom of page
564, what the learned Lord Justice says: " Under these circumstances, no doubt, there is some difficulty in saying what is the
ground upon which the money is to be obtained from the landlord.
I do not think that technically the company have a right to recover
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bItck the money which they have paid, but they have a right to the
benefit of what the assured has received"-I will mark these words
particularly-" in respect of a contract referring to the loss, by which
he was entitled to receive compensation in damages, and which they
might have called upon him to enforce for their benefit; when he
has received that benefit, they can treat him as being under an obligation to use it as they may direct." Presently he speaks again of
the contract relating to the loss. Lord Justice THESIGER divides
the case into the question of substance and the question of form,
and his judgment is very much to the same effect, although the
expressions which he uses are somewhat different. He says, at
page 567, that he is "by no means prepared to say that there may
not be some contracts so entirely independent of the subject-matter
of the insurance as to put the ,assured in the position of being more
than indemnified in the event of a loss." Then when'he deals
with the question of form he uses, as I have already said, various
modes of expression in order to surmount and get over the technical
difficulty which pressed upon him.
In the present case I am asked to go far beyond the principle of
that decision. It is admitted on the part of the plaintiffs that the
principle of subrogation cannot apply here. It was felt impossible
to contend that the insurers on payment of the loss were entitled
to bring, either in their own names or in the names of the vendors,
the defendants, an action to enforce the contract of sale, or even to
compel the vendors to complete. The contract of sale was not
a contract either directly or indirectly for the preservation of the
buildings insured. The contract of insurance was a collateral contract wholly distinct from and unaffected by the contract of sale.
The attempt now made is to convert the insurance against loss
by fire into an assurance of the solvency of the purchasers. The,
position of the vendors in equity at the time when the fire occurred
was this: they had no right of action against the purchasers at the
time, but on giving notice fixing the day, they were entitled to
recover the purchase-money after that day had passed, and the
land and buildings in the -meantime constituted their security under
the doctrine of vendor's equitable lien for the payment of the purchase-money. Now the security was impaired by the fire. It was
said that the purchase-money having been legitimately paid, the
vendors in the result suffered no loss.
I will try the proposition asserted by one or two illustrations
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which occur to me. Take the case of a landlord insuring and the
tenant under no obligation to repair, a case which I had before me
the other day, where, under an informal agreement, evidently drawn
by the parties themselves, the large rent of 7001. was reserved, and
the tenant, notwithstanding the fire, was bound to pay the rent.
I stay here to say that a lease, as has been often held, is but a sale
pro tanto. Now, assume that the building in such a case was
ruinous and would last the length, of the term only, could the
insurers recover a proportionate part of each payment of the rent
as it was made, or could they wait until the end of the term, and
then say, in effect, You have been paid for the whole value of the
building and, therefore, we can recover against you ? Or, to vary
the case somewhat, again, suppose the building at the end of the
term was only half the value, could the insurers then recover half
-the sum they had paid? I think not. I think all these questions
must be answered in the negative, but, if the plaintiffs are right
in their contention, then the insurers could recover in all those
cases.
Now, by way of further test, I put two other cases which have
actually occurred and been decided, and, as I think, rightly decided,
in the American courts. The first is the case of I-ing v. State
MVutual ire insurance Co., 7 Cush. 1. The mortgagee there
sought to recover the amount of the insurance from the insurers,
and they claimed to be entitled to an assignment of the proportionate part of the mortgage debt, and it was held by the Supreme
Court that he was not bound to make any such assignment. The
judgment of the Chief Justice contains a full and masterly exposition of the law on the subject. It is too long for me to quote at
length, but there may be one or two passages which I can select.
"The contract of insurance," he says at page 4, "with the mortgagee
is not an insurance of the debt or of the payment of the debt; that
would be an insurance of the solvency of the debtor: of course,
as a contract of indemnity, it is not broken by the non-payment
of the debt, or saved by its payment. It is not, strictly speaking,
an insurance of the property, in the sense of the liability for the
loss of the property by fire, to anyone who may be the owner. It
is rather a personal contract with the person having a proprietary
interest in it that the property should sustain no loss by fire within
the time expressed in the policy." At page 5 he says, "There'is no
privity of contract or of estate, in fact or in law, between the
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insurer and the mortgagor; but each has a separate and independent contract with the mortgagee. On what ground, then, can the
money thus paid by the insurer to the mortgagee be claimed by the
mortgagor ? But if he cannut, it seems d fortiori that the insurer
cannot claim to charge his loss on the mortgagor, which he would
do, if he were entitled to an assignment of the mortgage debt either
in full or pro tanto." At the bottom of the page he put it thus:
"So, if an owner insure his house, which is burnt within the time
limited; if he has sold his house in the meantime, he has no legal
claim to recover." He evidently means there that the house at the
time when the loss has occurred has been not merely sold but conveyed. At page 8 he says, "But it is said, and in this certainly lies
the strength of the argument, that it would be inequitable for the
mortgagee first to recover a total loss from the underwriters, and
afterwards to recover the full amount of his debt from the mortgagor,
to his own use. It would be, as it is said, to receive a double satisfaction. This is plausible and requires consideration. Let us
examine it. Is it a double satisfaction for the same thing, the same
debt or duty ? The case supposed is this: a man makes a loan of
money, and takes a bond and mortgage for security. Say the loan
is for ten years." That is an illustration that had occurred to me,
and I think it is an excellent one. "He gets insurance on his own
interest as mortgagee. At the expiration of seven years the buildings are burnt down; he claims and recovers a loss to the amount
insured, being equal to the greater part of his debt. He afterwards
receives the amount of his debt from the mortgagor, and discharges
his mortgage. Has he received double satisfaction for one and the
same debt? He surely may recover of the mortgagor because he
is his debtor, and on good consideration has contracted to pay.
The money received from the underwriters was not a payment of
his debt; there was no privity between the mortgagor and the
underwriters; he had not contracted with them to pay it for him,
on any contingency. He had paid them nothing for so doing.
They did not pay because the mortgagor owed it; but because they
had bound themselves, in the event which has happened, to pay a
certain sum to the mortgagee. But the mortgagee, when he claims
of the underwriters, does not claim the same debt. He claims a
sum of money due to him upon a distinct and independent contract,
upon a consideration paid by himself, that on a certain event, to wit,
the burning of a particular house, they will pay him a sum of money

CASTELLAIN v. PRESTON.

1[17

expressed." Then, at the bottom of page 9, he says, " What, then,
is there inequitable, on the part of the mortgagee, towards either
party, in holding both sums ? They are both due on valid contracts
with him, made on adequate consideration paid by himself. There
is nothing inequitable to the debtor, for he pays no more than he
originally received in money loaned ; nor to the underwriter, for he
has only paid upon a risk voluntarily taken, for which he was paid
by the mortgagee a full and satisfactory equivalent." Then he
mentions that the court is aware that there were respectable authorities opposed to the view of the law that was taken, and he mentions
particularly the case of .,Etna Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 385, and
says this being the judgment of the whole court, that "looking to
the analogies and illustrations on which the reasoning of the learned
Ohancellor was founded, it may be a question whether he has not
relied too much on the cases of marine insurance, in which the
doctrine of constructive total loss, abandonment, and salvage are
fully acknowledged, but which have slight application to insurance
against loss by fire." Then at the end, on page 14, he says, "On a
view of the whole question, the court are of opinion that a mortgagee who gets insurance for himself, when that insurance is general
upon the property, without limiting it in terms to his interest as
mortgagee, but when, in point of fact, his only insurable interest
is that of a mortgagee, in case of a loss by fire, before the payment of
the debt and discharge of the mortgage, has a right to recover the
amount of the loss for his own use." The position of the unpaid vendor in equity is analogous, although I will not say it is precisely
the same as the position of a mortgagee.
The other American case is that of Suffolk FireIns. Co. v. Boyden, 9 Allen 123. In that case a bill in equity was filed, and
it was held that where the interest of the mortgagee in possession
had been insured eo nomine at his own expense, the insurers, in
case of a loss by fire before the mortgage debt is paid, cannot, upon
an offer to pay the loss and the amount due ofn the mortgage above
the loss, maintain a bill in equity to Lave the mortgage assigned to
them, and to be subrogated to the rights and remedies of the
insured under the mortgage. It was said in argument that in the
case of Kiinq v. State iM1utual Fire Ins. Co., 7 Oush. 1, it was
not necessary to decide the point to which the greater part of the
judgment was devoted, and this case of The Suffolk Fire Insuranee Company was brought, raising the point neatly for judgment.
VOL. XXXI.-23
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But the court held that the principles which were laid down in the
case of King v. State l'utual Fire Insurance Company were
correctly laid down, and in substance adopted them. I think it
unnecessary to read any portion of the judgment in that case,
because, in substance, the judgment proceedg upon identically the
same principles as those of the former case which I have alieady
mentioned.
Now, I will put a case also by way of testing the principle which
the plaintiff asserts. Supposing the mortgagor or the tenant are
under no obligation to repair, and they repair voluntarily, according to the decision of Burnand v. Bodocanachi, that would be a
gift on behalf of the mortgagor or the tenant to the landlord, and
there would be no subrogation.
Well, the conclusion I arrive at is, that I should not be justified,
either by principle or by authority, in carrying the doctrine of
subrogation beyond the limits which I have mentioned, and the
short ground of my decision is, that the only principle applicable
is that of subrogation as understood in the full sense of that term,
and that where the right claimed is under a contract between the
insured and third parties, it must be confined to the case of a contract relating to the subject-matter of the insurance which entitles
the insurer to have the damages made good. And although this
point is not necessary for my judgment, I think the contract should
be one which subsists at the time when the claim under the policy
of insurance has been matured.
There were certain minor points raised in the case by the pleadings of the defendants, but they were all very properly abandoned
at the bar, and the case was argued on the substantial question
which I have decided. It was argued also that in this case the
plaintiffs were seeking to recover for the benefit of the purchasers
on an indemnity, but that, in any view of the case, would be wholly
immaterial, because the plaintiffs were suing on their own rights
if any rights they had. In the same way it was said the defendants,
being trustees, were bound to defend the action, but trustees who
are defendants in defending an action, defend it just in the same
way as any other ordinary defendaiits. The result therefore is that
I think the claim fails; and there must be
Judgment for the defendants.
The precise question involved in the
principal case where the assured has made

an absolute sale of the premises insured,
does not seem to haye been decided in
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our courts; but the somewhat analogous
case of a mortgage has frequently arisen;
and the views entertained by eminent
tribunals are so different that it can not
be considered a settled question. On
the one band it has been held after
elaborate examination that if insurance
is effected by a mortgagee on his own
interest, and for his own benefit, an
insurance company which pays the loss
to the mortgagee, though to the fall
amount of his mortgage debt, is not
thereby entitled to an assignment of the
mortgage in the absence of any stipulation to that effect; but notwithstanding
the payment of the loss to the mortgagee,
he may still recover his mortgage debt
of the mortgagor, and so in one sense
'have a double compensation for the same
debt. Undoubtedly the leading case in
supporting that view is King v. The
State 3futual Fire Tns. Co., 7 Cush. I
(1850), one of Chief Justice Sgxwls
ablest opinions. This has been followed
in the same state by Suffolk Ins. Co.
v. Boyden, 9 Allen 125 ; Haley v.
.fanufacturers' Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 296.
And see Ins. Co. v. Stinson, 103 U. S.
R. 28; State Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Updegraff, 21 Penn. St.-513. On the
other hand the weight of authority,
numerically, seems to be that the insurance company having paid a loss to the
mortgagee, equal to his full mortgage
debt, is in equity entitled to subrogation,
and to have the benefit of the mortgage
in reimbursing itself. This viewis more
or less supported by the cases of Etna
Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 397; Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co.,
16 Pet. 495 ; Sussex Co. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Woodruq, 2 Dutch. 555 ; .onore v.
Lamar Fire Ins. Co., 51 Ill. 414;
Kernochan v. New York Bow ry Fire
Ins. Co., 17 N. Y., 429; Springfield
Fire J" 3far. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 43 Id.
393 ; Norwich Fire Ins. Co. v. Boomer,
52 flI. 442; Foster v. Tan Reed, 70 X.
Y. 24.
The question was raised though not

decided in Concord Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Woodbury, 45 Ale. 452; Rleesor v. -Provincial Ins. Co., 33 Up. Can. Q. B. 357.
And see Excelsior Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal
Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 343; Provincial Ins.
ao. v. Reesor, 21 Grant's Ch. Rl.296.
It will be seen that the right of an
insurance company which has paid a
mortgagee, to an assignment of his mortgage, is quite different from the right of
the mortgagee to collect his full debt of
the mortgagor, notwithstanding the payment by the insurers: for it is quite
generally agreed that the mortgagor can
not avail hnself of such payment, when
the mortgagee has himself for his own
benefit, and at his own expense, taken
out a policy in his own name, and on his
own interest solely. See White v. Brown,
2 Cush. 413; Cushing v. Thompson, 34
Ale. 496 ; Clark v. Wilson, 103 Mass.
221 ; Stinchfieldv. M3illiken, 71 Me. 567;
Archambault v. Galarneau, 22 Low.
Can. Jur. 105 (1897).
While therefore the mortgagee may
recover his full mortgage debt of the
mortgagor, notwithstanding a full payment by the insurers of a loss fully equal
to the mortgage, is the converse equally
true ? Can the mortgagee recover on
his policy, if after the fire and before
suit brought, the mortgagor has fully
paid the mortgage debt. Does such payment terminate his interest in the policy,
so that his right to recover is thenceforward gone?
That it would be terminated by full
payment before the loss is quite clear;
and it is generally agreed that a mortgagee who has insured only his interest
in the premises can not recover if before
the fire the mortgage debt has been fully
paid; for it is elementary law that the
insured must have an interest at the time
of the loss, as well as at the time of
insurance, and payment of the debt
terminates a mere mortgagee's interest.
But where the loss occurs before the
debt is paid, and while the interest of the
assured still continues as at the issuing

